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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

the court of appeals reasoned that because genuine factual issues
existed, summary judgment was improper. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded.
Makayla Shannon
ARIZONA
In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River
Sys. & Source, 9 P.3d 1069 (Ariz. 2000) (holding (1) the subflow zone
in the Gila River system is defined as saturated floodplain Holocene
alluvium, and waters from wells with cones of depression extending
into this subflow zone are appropriable; (2) a well is presumed to be
pumping percolating groundwater, until the Department of Water
Resources establishes by a preponderance of evidence the well is
pumping subflow via its cone of depression; and (3) judicially
redefining subflow to include percolating, non-appropriable waters is
not an unconstitutional taking of private property or an usurpation of
the legislative function by the courts).
In an action to determine the extent and priority of water use
rights in the Gila River system and source, the trial court adopted a test
that presumed a well pumped appropriable subflow if the volume of a
given stream was shown to be depleted by 50% or more of the total
volume pumped by a well during a ninety-day period. The court of
appeals rejected the "50%/90-day test" as inconclusive to determine
the nature of the water being pumped. On remand, the trial court
held a ten-day evidentiary hearing, using testimony and reports from
hydrologists and hydrological engineers, to develop a test to determine
which waters were part of the subflow, and thus appropriable for
public use. The trial court found the Holocene alluvium was the only
stable geological unit associated with most rivers and streams. When
saturated, this sedimentary layer becomes subflow. Wells connected to
the subflow were subject to public-use doctrines. Identical gradient
and flow direction, chemical composition, groundwater elevation of
the saturated floodplain Holocene alluvium, and water from the well
indicated connection to the subflow.
Groundwater users from several cities asked the trial court to
exclude certain wells from the adjudication. The trial court applied
the new test to determine subflow and found that wells within the
saturated floodplain Holocene alluvium were subject to rules
regarding public appropriation. Further, wells outside the alluvium
found to be pumping water from a stream or its subflow were also
subject to adjudication, unless such use was determined to have a de
minimus effect on the river system. The trial court ordered the
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Department of Water Resources ("DWR") to designate well use
according to the new rule and to reflect these designations in its
hydrographic surveys. The groundwater users appealed, claiming the
rule was arbitrary and the tests suggested by the trial court did not
provide a reliable means to determine a connection between a well
and the subflow where a direct connection did not already exist.
Further, the groundwater users claimed application of the new
standard was a legislative act, and violated constitutional separation of
powers principles. Finally, the groundwater users contended the new
rule constituted an unauthorized taking of private property in
violation of their Fifth Amendment rights.
In connection with the test applied by the lower court, the
groundwater users argued the subflow zone should be limited to the
"post-1880 entrenchment channel" which their experts testified was a
well-known, well-documented, and reliable indicator of subflow. The
supreme court rejected this argument, noting that testimony and
reports available to the trial court also indicated the saturated
floodplain Holocene alluvium was a distinct geological unit, which
provided a direct hydraulic connection to the stream. This connection
could be verified by analyzing the groundwater elevation in the
saturated floodplain Holocene alluvium, gradient and flow direction,
or comparison with the chemical composition of surface water. The
trial court found, as a matter of fact, that the use of the saturated
floodplain Holocene alluvium was reliable based on geology and
aquifer characteristics. The supreme court affirmed, finding use of the
floodplain Holocene alluvium as an indicator of subflow was clearly
supported by the evidence.
The supreme court also affirmed the lower court's finding that
wells outside the subflow zone parameters might be subject to the
adjudication in cases where their cones of depression extend into
adjacent subflow zones. Further, the court asserted that DWR analysis
of the gradient, flow, or chemical composition of water from a well's
cone of depression could be used to determine whether a well is
pumping subflow. When a well is located outside the saturated
floodplain Holocene alluvium, the court found a strong initial
presumption that the well is pumping percolating groundwater.
However, once DWR determines a well pumped subflow, the well
owner must rebut this finding by presenting a preponderance of
evidence to the contrary.
Finally, the supreme court rejected the groundwater users'
argument that judicially redefining the subflow violated both
separation of powers principles and the Fifth Amendment. First, the
court noted it had established subflow guidelines for nearly seventy
years without any action or direction from the legislature. Second, the
new definition of subflow was addressed only to appropriable water
and did not change the legal status of underground water outside the
subflow zone. Third, through specific statutory authorization, the
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court had jurisdiction to hear issues related to subflow. Finally,
because a well owner has no legal property right to underground water
that supplies his well, any claims involving violation of the Fifth
Amendment were nonmeritous.
Alan Curtis
ARKANSAS
Whisenhunt v. Bee Branch Water Ass'n, No. CA 99-165, 2000 Ark. App.
LEXIS 297 (Ark. Ct. App. April 12, 2000) (holding a chancellor's
finding that placing water lines beneath a road's surface consistent
with the public's use was not clearly erroneous).
Joe Whisenhunt ("Whisenhunt") appealed from the chancellor's
order to dissolve a preliminary injunction and dismiss his complaint.
Whisenhunt purchased property to construct a subdivision. Bee
Branch Water Association ("Bee Branch") allegedly made an oral
agreement to provide water to the subdivision, but Bee Branch later
declined to provide the water. Due to Whisenhunt's objections, the lot
owners filed suit against Bee Branch. Unbeknownst to Whisenhunt,
the lot owners and Bee Branch obtained a settlement. Whisenhunt
filed a motion to intervene and requested a permanent injunction to
stop Bee Branch from placing water lines beneath Lakeview Drive,
which Whisenhunt claimed to own.
The determinative issues in this case were whether the roadway was
dedicated to public use and whether that dedication included the
privilege of laying water lines beneath the roadway. The court
engaged in de novo review and refused to reverse the chancellor's
factual findings unless such were clearly erroneous. The Arkansas
Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor's decision to allow
Whisenhunt to intervene, but found Bee Branch had the right to lay
water lines beneath the roadway.
The court found that placing water lines beneath a road's surface
was consistent with the public's use. Thus, the chancellor's decision
was not clearly erroneous. Whisenhunt argued that under the
pertinent covenant, the location of utility easements was restricted to a
defined area outside of the roadway boundary. Whisenhunt argued
that the covenant's language, which set aside an area for utility
easements, could be interpreted as a limitation prohibiting such utility
placement in another location. The court disagreed and found that
while parties' intentions generally govern the interpretation of
covenants, when the language of the covenant is clear and
unambiguous, the meaning of the language governs. The court
determined these covenants used the word "reserved," meaning save

for a special purpose or special use. The covenants did not use
'restricted," meaning to confine or keep within limits.

